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The Mau Mau Uprising was a violent anticolonial struggle that took place in Kenya 
between 1952 and 1960.  During the Uprising, firearms were extremely difficult for Mau Mau 
fighters to obtain.  The few precision weapons they could acquire came from raided government 
armories or those found on the battlefield.  In order to make up the difference, the Mau Mau 
leadership turned to resources that were more readily available and relied on the ingenuity of 
their supporters.  The result was a series of homemade firearms manufactured by Mau Mau 
fighters and sympathizers.  This thesis argues that homemade guns were a unique example of the 
successful adaptation of firearms technology. In addition, the Mau Mau made the guns integral to 
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Figure 1: Map of Kenya: circa 19201 
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 The Mau Mau Uprising was a violent anticolonial struggle that took place in Kenya 
between 1952 and 1960.  The British formed the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya out of their 
East Africa Protectorate in 1920.  As Kenya developed into a white settlement colony, Europeans 
confiscated ancestral lands from Africans.  During the period of decolonization that took place 
after the Second World War, Kenya became a hotbed for political anticolonial activity, 
particularly within the Kikuyu community.  The Kikuyu were the largest tribal ethnicity within 
Colonial Kenya.  After decades of oppression, theft, and violence perpetrated by the British, the 
Kikuyu movement known as Mau Mau rebelled against British colonial rule.  The Mau Mau 
sought the forceful expulsion of the British from Kenya in order to regain their land and 
freedom.  The British responded to the outbreak of violence by declaring a State of Emergency 
on October 20, 1952.2 
 After the colonial government declared an emergency, firearms became extremely 
difficult for Mau Mau fighters to obtain.  The few precision weapons Mau Mau could acquire 
came from raided government armories or guns found on the battlefield.  In order to make up the 
difference, the Mau Mau leadership had to arm their fighters in another way.  They turned to 
readily available resources and relied on the ingenuity of their supporters.  The result was a 
series of homemade firearms manufactured by Mau Mau fighters and sympathizers.  This thesis 
argues that homemade guns were a unique example of the successful adaptation of firearms 
technology. In addition, the Mau Mau made the guns integral to their military efforts.  To this 
 
2 S. H. Fazan, Colonial Kenya Observed: British Rule, Mau Mau and the Wind of Change (London: I. B. Tauris & 




day, the guns hold a prominent place within Mau Mau historical memory.  Homemade guns 
represent a concrete example of an oppressed people finding an uncommon way to obtain the 
necessary firepower in order to confront their enemy. 
 To substantiate my argument, I developed a series of research questions. My research 
started with a fundamental question.  Why was it necessary for the Mau Mau to construct their 
own firearms?  During the era of decolonization, one can find any number of armed struggles for 
independence.  Yet, none of these conflicts feature an improvised firearm.  Such rebellions and 
revolutions were further complicated by the involvement of Cold War superpowers.  The 
superpowers often armed their chosen side with AK-47s or M-16s.  The Mau Mau Uprising 
stands outside this norm.  Why was Mau Mau the exception and what other factors led to the 
creation of homemade guns?  The next set of questions I developed dealt with the technical and 
mechanical aspects of the guns.  Who designed the guns, how did Mau Mau source parts, and 
how were the guns constructed?  How prominent were the homemade guns as Mau Mau 
weaponry?  How important were the guns to the Mau Mau movement?  These questions became 
the foundation of my research.  Their answers, naturally, led me to more questions. 
 Decolonization in Africa came on the heels of the Second World War.  Many Africans 
who fought in that war also fought for their own independence in the subsequent decades.  This 
drove me to ask, how did World War II affect Kenya and its people?  How were Mau Mau 
fighters influenced by that war?  Did they receive training that helped them to develop the 
homemade guns?  The answers to such questions led me to the strategic and tactical implications 




manufactured precision weapons?  How were they implemented at the small unit level?  Did the 
guns foster a dichotomy between the tactical effectiveness and the strategic goals of the KLFA? 
 Throughout my research, I found conflicting perspectives within the context of memory.  
The conflicts made me curious about the overall historical memory of the homemade guns.  How 
have Mau Mau and British veterans remembered the homemade guns?  How have their opinions 
shaped historical memory?  Is there a balance between their differing recollections that can 
create a more accurate picture?  The above questions guided my overall research and the 
arguments of the thesis. 
Historical Context for the Development of Mau Mau 
 The British settlement of Kenya began in earnest with the £6.5 million construction of the 
Uganda Railway.  Completed in 1901, it tied the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa to the interior 
Lake Victoria.  More important than the financial cost, British expansion into Kenya killed 
thousands of, stole property from, and disrupted the lifeways of Africans who lived in the 
railway’s path.  Upon the railway’s completion, British Parliament concerned itself with ways to 
recoup funds expended on the project.  Great Britain charged the first commissioner of the 
territory, Charles Elliot, with finding a solution.  In Elliot’s opinion, the local African populace 
was too sparse and uncivilized to form an economy around the railroad.  Willing to seize more 
land from indigenous Africans, Elliot and Parliament promoted white settlement of the colony as 




metropole and South Africa with low interest loans, subsides, and long-term leases.3  The 
Kikuyu people were the hardest hit by the influx of white settlers.  Their ancestral lands were in 
the highland region of Kenya.  Not only did the highlands contain a long portion of the railway, 
it was agriculturally and pastorally fertile.  White settlers took the highlands for themselves and 
forced a great number of Kikuyu into urban areas and reserves.  In many ways, the grievances of 
the Mau Mau began with the Uganda Railway and its ramifications.   
 As white settlement grew, the British codified theft and subjugation of the Kikuyu into 
race-based laws.  The regulations forced many more Kikuyu to leave their ancestral lands and 
relocate into reserves and urban areas.  Punitive taxation disenfranchised Kikuyu from 
participation in elections.  A pass and identification system restricted their freedom of 
movement.  And, to prevent Kikuyu from competing with white farmers, the British instituted 
market restrictions on Kikuyu grown crops.  Unable to freely compete for sales, many Kikuyu 
turned to the tightly controlled urban wage labor market.4  The British rebranded the few Kikuyu 
who stayed on their ancestral lands as “squatters.”  Their land now controlled by white settlers; 
Kikuyu resided on it at the pleasure of the new landowner.  The landowners benefited from this 
situation because they used the Kikuyu “squatters” as agricultural labor in a system akin to 
feudalism or sharecropping.  As white landowners embraced mechanized farming, however, they 
forced many of the remaining Kikuyu into the overcrowded reserves and urban areas.5  
Politically active Kikuyu pointed to such abuses as their chief complaints against the British.  In 
 
3 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 2005), 1-11.  At first, leases lasted ninety-nine years.  Eventually, settlers obtained an extension to 999 
years.   
4 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 15-16. 
5 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: W. W. 




1948, a group of Kikuyu swore a secret oath to forcibly remove the British and restore Kikuyu 
land and freedom.  Four years later, the Mau Mau began an open rebellion against British 
colonial rule.  To maintain the appearance of a domestic dispute, the British declared the 
situation an emergency.  In reality, this was a full-scale revolt by the Mau Mau and the British 
response was one of a counter-insurgency.    
Historiography of Mau Mau 
The first historical works on Mau Mau came from the British and, primarily, served as 
attempts to explain away and disparage the movement.  These early works, written during the 
Uprising, set the tone for the first few decades of scholarship.  In addition to British scholars, 
British military personnel who served in Kenya during the uprising contributed to the overall 
tone of the early historiography.  These biographical adventure histories, along with the official 
British perspective, contributed greatly to the historiography.  After Kenya’s independence, Mau 
Mau adherents began to tell their version of the history of the event in the form of memoirs.  
During the cultural turn, scholars of Mau Mau incorporated these memoirs into their own 
research.  Their groundbreaking research challenged the conventional narrative.  Critical eyes 
then turned toward activities of the British, while others discussed the Mau Mau in the larger 
contexts of decolonization, nationalism, and memory.  The present section highlights the 
significant works that defined the trends and shifts of this historiography. 
Considered official reports on the Mau Mau Emergency, early entries in Mau Mau 
literature led with sensational titles and stories of savagery.  Three works of particular interest 




(1954), and C. T. Stoneman’s Out of Barbarism (1955).6  These three works exemplify the trend 
of Mau Mau scholarship during the time of the Emergency.  Each offers a similar arc and tone.  
The authors began with a history of Kenya before the Mau Mau.  Adoringly described as a 
bountiful and peaceful place, the authors blissfully overlooked the draconian measures placed on 
the indigenous population.  The authors described the Kikuyu as loyal servants and hard workers 
that suddenly turned on their paternal masters.  The narratives then shifted to the conflict as it 
was at the time of their writing.  They invariably painted the Mau Mau as the aggressors, 
deranged by an oath to a barbarous ideology.  The authors were quick to point to violence on 
behalf of the Mau Mau, describing events such as the Ruck family murders, but hesitate to 
describe the rampant violence conducted at the hands of the British.  From their perspective, the 
severity of the British response was acceptable in order to crush the Mau Mau.  Since these 
authors wrote during the conflict, they concluded with a look forward.  Generally, they 
advocated for the traditional civilizing mission of Great Britain to help the Kikuyu move beyond 
Mau Mau.  Their point of view disregarded the legitimate grievances of Kikuyu and other native 
Kenyans, thus helping to cement the perspective of the British on the Mau Mau narrative.  Leigh, 
however, did provide some space to hear from Mau Mau fighters.  In one example, he reprinted 
an excerpt from a manifesto written by a Mau Mau leader.7  While these works do not reflect 
academic scholarship by today’s standards, they are important to the historiography of the Mau 
Mau.  Along with military and newspaper reports, they set the narrative’s tone for decades and 
shaped the conventional history of the Uprising. 
 
6 Ione Leigh, In the Shadow of Mau Mau (London: W. H. Allen, 1954); Ian McDougall, African Turmoil (London: 
Elek, 1954); C. T. Stoneham, Out of Barbarism (London: Museum Press Limited, 1955). 




Those who fought against the Mau Mau provided the next contribution to the 
historiography.  Ian Henderson grew up in the Central Province of Kenya.  He spoke Kikuyu and 
developed close ties with native Kenyans.  As a member of Special Branch, he took part in raids 
and arrests during the Emergency.  In 1956, Henderson led a team to find Dedan Kimathi, one of 
the last holdouts of the Mau Mau leadership.  Henderson’s autobiography The Hunt for Kimathi 
(1958) tells this story.8  Similarly, Bwana Drum (1964), written by Dennis Holman, tells the 
story of David Drummond.9  He shares a similar background to Henderson and is responsible for 
the capture and conversion of over forty Mau Mau fighters.  Both men received acclaim and 
praise at the time of their exploits.  Later in life, Henderson found himself at the center of a 
controversy regarding his methods as a member of Special Branch.  Their books read like 
adventure novels.  Though they are not academic in nature, they are no less important to the 
literature.  Indeed, they represent a wider context for the historiography of the Mau Mau.  
Because the British controlled the narrative in and out of academia, the Mau Mau entered 
popular culture as a villain in tales of ‘real life’ heroism.  Despite the potential for exaggerated 
details and hyperbole, these works do have academic use.  Both Henderson and Drummond 
demonstrate respect for their foe, especially in terms of ingenuity and bush craft.  On multiple 
occasions, they mention the homemade firearms used by the Mau Mau, a unique aspect of 
weaponry in this conflict.  The voice and agency of the Mau Mau begins to grow with these 
books as well.  Kimathi has a miniature biography in Hunt and the converted Mau Mau are 
integral to the narrative.  Indeed, some go on to lead their own pseudo gangs.10  Though 
 
8 Ian Henderson, The Hunt for Kimathi (London: Hamish & Hamilton Ltd, 1958). 
9 Dennis Holman, Bwana Drum (London: W. H. Allen, 1964). 
10 Pseudo gangs were comprised of former Mau Mau fighters who left the movement in support of the British forces.  
Individuals like Henderson and Drummond used them to infiltrate Mau Mau gangs.  For more information, see 




Henderson and Drummond are the filters for this information, these works take the Mau Mau 
fighters beyond the mindless savage trope of earlier works.  Moreover, having fought alongside 
the Mau Mau, they were the first writers to describe them with such depth and respect. 
When hostilities ceased in 1960, historical surveys of the Mau Mau Uprising began to 
take shape.  F. D. Corfield authored one of the first comprehensive works on the Mau Mau in the 
years after the Uprising, but before independence.  While he did not have the long perspective of 
time, published in 1960, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau went to great lengths in 
explaining what happened in the preceding years.  Unlike previous reports, such as Leigh or 
Stoneman’s, Corfield used statistical analysis and other academic methods to attempt to explain 
the Mau Mau.  Despite this, he still holds a decidedly British point of view.  Instead of beginning 
with the romantic glory days of Colonial Kenya, though, he sought the roots of Kikuyu political 
activity.  His analysis of oathing is of keen interest.  He does not dismiss the Kikuyu belief in the 
power of an oath as an uncivilized belief in witchcraft.  Instead, he uses it to inform his analysis 
and explain the awesome power an oath had over a Kikuyu individual.11  Corfield’s work on 
firearms is also valuable.  In this chapter, he studies the data of lost and stolen precision weapons 
to explain the firearm black market that the Mau Mau operated.  He provides the first published 
analysis of how many precision weapons the Mau Mau obtained during the conflict.  He also 
dedicates a portion of this chapter to the homemade firearms of the Mau Mau.12  He has some 
preliminary numbers on how many of these homemade guns were in circulation and provides a 
detailed description of their construction.13  Though he does not present direct analysis linking 
 
11 F. D. Corfield, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau: A Historical Survey (Nairobi: Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya, 1960), 163. 
12 Corfield, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, 230 231. 




precision and homemade guns, one can see from the numbers that homemade guns were of 
common use.  In doing so, he demonstrates the agency and ability of the Mau Mau to forge their 
own way when precision weapons became scarce. 
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, a heavily debated form of scholarship entered the Mau 
Mau discourse.  These contributions came from the Mau Mau themselves.  These works consist 
of memoirs, autobiographies, and life histories that provided the point of view of the movement’s 
adherents.14  In their time, Western and, even some, Kenyan scholars dismissed these writings as 
biased, because these works contradicted the British-centric narrative of Mau Mau history.  In 
the late 1990s, Marshall S. Clough’s Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory, and Politics argued 
that these narratives were crucial and valid contributions to the historiographical debate 
surrounding the Mau Mau.15  To bolster his argument, he selected thirteen important works 
written by various Mau Mau adherents.  These narratives span twenty-five years and provide an 
inclusive scope for his analysis.  Clough’s cultural discourse analysis is an important 
contribution.  His is the first work to argue the Mau Mau point of view as a valid part of the 
conversation.  His methodology demonstrates how subaltern voices, previously barred from the 
larger historical debate, are necessary for a more complete understanding of the event.  
Arguably, his work created a pathway for the works of the twenty-first century that turned the 
Mau Mau narrative on its head. 
 
14 Examples of such memoirs are Josiah Mwangi Kariuki. 'Mau Mau' Detainee: The Account by a Kenya African of 
His Experiences in Detention Camps 1953-60 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); Donald L, Barnett, and 
Karari Njama. Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt (London: The Garden 
City Press Limited, 1966); and Waruhiu Itote, Mau Mau General (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967). 





In 2003, two high profile scholars of Kenyan and Mau Mau history came together and 
produced an edited volume that attempted to highlight the Mau Mau movement’s contribution to 
nationhood.  E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale’s Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, 
Authority, and Narration weaves this complex tale of national history by compiling contributions 
from both veteran and trendsetting Mau Mau scholars.16  Earlier works discussed the role of 
nationalism in the Mau Mau struggle, but this work surpasses them with intricacy and nuance.  
Each author provides a chapter that exposes factors that demonstrate the Mau Mau’s contribution 
to an independent Kenyan state.  In doing so, these historians put forth a larger argument about 
the similarities between Kenya’s struggle for national identity and other pluralistic states inside 
and outside of Africa.17  Often, historians place Africa on the outside of world history’s narrative 
of political modernity.  The chapters within this edited volume demonstrate how the events of the 
Mau Mau Uprising have parallels in other regions and nations.  Mau Mau and Nationhood also 
acts as an appetizer to the developing research methodologies and arguments put forth in the 
early twenty-first century. 
In 2005, two groundbreaking works on the Mau Mau Uprising changed the direction of 
the historiography.  The first of these contributions is by Caroline Elkins.  Written over the 
course of a decade, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya exposed 
the atrocities that occurred within the British detention and rehabilitation camps.  Prior to her 
publishing, the narrative of this system suggested a successful civilizing mission on behalf of the 
British.  What she unearthed completely dispelled this myth.  Rather than a small population of 
 
16 E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale, Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority & Narration (Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 2003). 




radicalized fighters in need of reform, she argues that the British detained about 1.5 million 
people, or nearly the entire Kikuyu population, over the course of the Emergency.18  In addition 
to compelling statistics, Elkins also complied innumerable stories of torture and abuse.  She built 
on the civil strife between Mau Mau and loyalists and, largely for the first time, exposed the 
plight of Kikuyu women.  Her findings were so controversial at the time, that some corners of 
academia argued that she based her research on hearsay oral histories and made much of the 
book up.  Lawsuits filled by Mau Mau and Kikuyu survivors since the time of her book’s 
publishing forced the declassification of many documents, thereby vindicating her work to 
skeptics.19    
The second groundbreaking book of 2005 was David Anderson’s Histories of the 
Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire.  Like Elkins, Anderson exposed the 
British side of the conflict.  He based his research methods on the colonial court testimonies, 
documents, and execution orders filled by the British for convicted Mau Mau fighters.  Just like 
the outrageous gulag system, he argues Britain also strayed from standard practices in the realm 
of judicial capital punishment.  According to court records used by Anderson, 1,090 Kikuyu 
received the death penalty based on guilty verdicts at trial.20  This detail drove much of 
Anderson’s research.  Because of his work, Anderson acted as an expert witness in the lawsuits 
discussed above.21  Both Elkins and Anderson gave voice and agency to the Mau Mau in a new 
 
18 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, xiv. 
19 Matt Kielty, producer, “Mau Mau,” Radiolab (podcast), July 3, 2015, accessed November 29, 2017, 
http://www.radiolab.org/story/mau-mau/. 
20 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 7. 




and refreshing way.  Much like the work of Clough, the Kikuyu point of view took a giant leap 
forward in Mau Mau scholarship. 
In the years since the publishing of Elkins and Anderson, Mau Mau scholarship has 
continued this new trajectory.  Three recent authors demonstrate different variations of this trend.  
Daniel Branch’s Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and 
Decolonization brings to the fore the Kikuyu loyalist.22  While the Mau Mau Uprising was, on 
the surface, a rebellion against the British, this third group created an internecine struggle within 
the Kikuyu community.  While many loyalists did actively fight on behalf of the British, some 
earned the title simply for refusing to support the Mau Mau.  Branch’s work expertly details the 
role and struggle of this sometimes-overlooked party.  He also moves beyond the Uprising itself 
and explains how political elites used these divisions to consolidate their power in an 
independent Kenya.23 
The second recent contribution comes from Myles Osborne.  In the spirit of Clough, he 
compiles Mau Mau memoirs, but instead of using multiple authors, he focuses on one individual.  
The Life and Times of General China: Mau Mau and the End of Empire in Kenya uses the 
various writings of Waruhiu Itote to tell Kenya’s story of decolonization.24  Itote was a prolific 
writer and proud member of the Mau Mau.  Osborne includes an abridged version of Itote’s 
autobiography, a transcript of his interrogation and trial, his letters as a political figure in the 
independent Kenyan government, and a eulogy from his funeral.  In addition to these primary 
 
22 Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
23 Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya, 52. 
24 Myles Osborne, The Life and Times of General China: Mau Mau and the End of Empire in Kenya, ed. Myles 




sources, Osborne provides historical analysis of the Mau Mau, Itote, and the documents 
surrounding him.  Though this is an edited volume of mostly primary sources, it makes an 
important contribution to the broader historiography by providing a window into the life of a 
man who played a large role on both sides of Kenyan independence.  Historians of Mau Mau and 
Kenya should value highly works such as this for the insights they can provide. 
The third work is by Nick van der Bijl.  His work titled The Mau Mau Rebellion: The 
Emergency in Kenya 1952-1956 focuses on the shooting war from the point of view of the 
British soldier.25  While much of the scholarship discusses the military aspects of the conflict, 
few delve below the ranks of the senior staff and officers.  Van der Bijl offers a comprehensive 
work that illuminates this otherwise overlooked aspect of life during the Uprising.  In many 
ways, his work brings Mau Mau scholarship full circle.  It began with the official top down 
British perspective and, overtime, transitioned into the Mau Mau perspective.  This latest 
contribution returns to the British point of view, but with a bottom up twist.  These three recent 
works demonstrate the latest trends and methods of Mau Mau scholarship and offer great 
opportunities for future work. 
This thesis builds on these recent trends in Mau Mau historiography.  It transcends the 
conventional scholarship on the homemade guns by providing a systematic and comprehensive 
account of the motivations for fashioning the guns as well as an analysis of their technical and 
mechanical dimensions thus contributing to the broader literature of the history of technology.26  
 
25 Nick van der Bijl, Mau Mau Rebellion: The Emergency in Kenya 1952-1956 (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword 
Military, 2017). 
26 Examples of works that deal with the history of technology, and specifically firearms in Africa, are Michael Adas, 
Machines as the Measures of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell 




In addition, the Second World War had great effects on Mau Mau leadership.  Veterans of that 
war fought on all sides of the Uprising and they add to the richness of the narrative.  Therefore, 
this work also contributes to the historiography of military and veterans’ history.27  As the very 
individuals who dealt with the homemade guns firsthand, the words of Mau Mau adherents and 
British soldiers strongly influenced this work.  Thus, this thesis contributes to the historiography 
of memory as well.28 
Sources and Methodology 
 The foundational primary sources of this research are the homemade firearms themselves.  
Currently the Imperial War Museum in London houses eleven such examples.  The 1st Battalion 
of the Royal East Kent Regiment, better known as the Buffs, obtained most of these examples 
during the Emergency.  The guns came to the United Kingdom as war trophies and now reside in 
vast firearms collection maintained by the IWM.  During the summer of 2018, I visited the IWM 
and inspected eight of these eleven examples.  The remaining three are on display at the IWM’s 
Manchester location.  Fortunately, the museum’s website has all eleven weapons as digital 
exhibits.29  In addition to images of the weapons themselves, the site offers a description, 
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historical context, and, when available, how the weapon came into the possession of the IWM.  
During my time with the guns, I took numerous photographs, measurements, and detailed notes 
regarding their composition and functionality. 
 While at the IWM, I also spent time in their reading room sifting through various 
documents held in their archives.  These included private papers compiled by individuals who 
spent time in Kenya and interacted with Mau Mau.  Their files contained notes, manuscripts, and 
declassified intelligence reports.  There were also propaganda magazines published by the 
British that depicted brutal attacks by Mau Mau in graphic detail.  Like Elkins, I saw little to 
suggest any British wrongdoing, save a few vague newspaper clippings and a handwritten letter 
from a detainee.  Some of these private papers have corresponding oral histories, like that of 
Terrance John Image.  His and other oral histories are available on the IWM’s website.30  
Listening to these firsthand accounts of British soldiers and civil servants amplified the detail of 
the primary documents.  For example, Image, as the commandant of a Mau Mau detention camp, 
was the addressee of the detainee letter mentioned above.  During his oral history, Image 
discussed this letter and others like it.31  This firsthand research at the IWM was invaluable to 
this thesis. 
On the other hand, similar oral histories or private papers of former Mau Mau are not so 
readily available.  In order to overcome this gap in primary sources, I relied on memoirs written 
by Mau Mau adherents.  In this way, the voice of the Mau Mau is present throughout this work.  
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I used Mau Mau memoirs to address their reasons for the need and construction of the guns, to 
analyze the relationship of the Second World War and Mau Mau leadership, to determine the 
homemade guns effects on Mau Mau tactics, and to place the guns within Mau Mau collective 
memory.  In order to check the bias of these writers, I regularly balanced their narratives against 
academic secondary sources. 
Organization 
 The homemade guns of the Mau Mau are an important and, heretofore, overlooked aspect 
of the Mau Mau Uprising.  In order to argue their importance, this thesis contains three chapters 
of supporting evidence and analysis.  Chapter One contains two sections.  The first discusses the 
relationship between the Second World War and the Mau Mau’s logistical ability to develop and 
field the homemade guns.  The second section argues why the Mau Mau saw a need to develop 
homemade guns.  Chapter Two also contains two parts.  Part one details the technological 
aspects of the homemade guns.  The second part of the chapter analyzes the dichotomy that 
existed between the tactical and strategic effectiveness of the guns.  Finally, Chapter Three 





CHAPTER ONE: WORLD WAR II VETERANS IN MAU MAU 
AND THE NEED FOR HOMEMADE GUNS 
The colonial regime in which the Mau Mau movement existed influenced its 
development and course.  The goals of the movement are apparent in the name the fighters chose 
for their army, The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA).  Kenya’s experience as a British 
Colony in the Second World War and the difficulty of acquiring firearms during the Uprising 
shaped the Mau Mau movement’s ability to achieve its goals.  This chapter contains two parts.  
The first discusses the African, Kenyan, and Kikuyu experiences in the Second World War.  I 
argue that the support roles that most Mau Mau veterans of World War II filled positioned them 
well to develop homemade guns during their anticolonial struggle..  The second part of this 
chapter focuses on why there were not enough manufactured guns within Kenya to arm the 
KLFA.  The Mau Mau attempted to overcome this need by developing homemade firearms.  
Additionally, I argue the prominence and importance of the homemade guns to the Mau Mau 
movement.     
Part One: Kikuyu Kenyan Veterans of World War II and Mau Mau 
The Second World War exacerbated the process of decolonization in Africa.  To 
understand the Mau Mau and their homemade firearms, an account of the Kikuyu Kenyan 
experience in the Second World War is necessary.  The following section attempts to do so by 
broadly explaining the role of Africa and Africans in World War II; the use of the King’s African 
Rifles (KAR), including a case study of the 11th Kenya Battalion; and an analysis of the support 




filled by Kikuyu in World War II had a greater effect on the development of homemade firearms 
during the Mau Mau Uprising than the rare instance of frontline training and combat in World 
War II. 
Africa and Africans in the Fighting of the Second World War 
 When global war broke out for a second time in the twentieth century, Africa was a 
battleground as well as a source of men and materiel for the conflict.  In some ways, the Second 
World War began in Africa before any fighting took place in Europe.  In October of 1935, 
Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia, known to Europeans as Abyssinia.32  During the last decades of 
the nineteenth century, Italy colonized a few African territories.  In 1896, they attempted and 
failed to colonize Ethiopia.  Italy’s second campaign in 1935 was a brutal reprisal for its defeat 
four decades earlier.  Due to Ethiopia’s proximity to British East African colonies, Great Britain 
quickly developed a response to Italian aggression.  They established East Africa Command, 
based in Nairobi, and then realigned existing colonial forces to repel a potential Italian invasion 
from Ethiopia.33  Italy held Ethiopia until the British, using their African colonial forces, and 
patriotic Ethiopians, led by Haile Selassie, removed the Italians and restored Ethiopian 
sovereignty in 1941.34 
 Other African regions became embroiled in conflict as the Second Word War progressed.  
North African territories, held by France and Great Britain, entered the war when Germany 
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invaded France in 1940.  When Paris fell in June of 1940, Brazzaville in French Equatorial 
Africa, became the capital of Free France in exile.  It was from this location that the Free French 
amassed troops to march north into Vichy North Africa. 35  By 1941, the German army moved 
into the Vichy French Territories of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.  Germany also sent troops to 
Libya to support their Italian allies.  In 1942, Allied Forces, including colonial troops, pressed 
from Egypt in the east and Morocco in the west to squeeze the Axis powers out of North 
Africa.36  By 1943, over half of the soldiers in the Free French Amy were tirailleurs, colonial 
troops recruited from French West and Equatorial Africa.37 
 In all the campaigns in Africa, Africans themselves played important roles.  Over a 
million troops came from the continent, fighting under the flags of their respective imperial 
powers. 38  Great Britain alone used over 500,000 African troops in the British army to fill 
combat and support roles.39  They forced thousands more African civilians to produce food and 
war materiel for the front.  In Nigeria, the British forced 18,000 laborers to work in tin mines.40  
In Kenya, the British installed a conscripted labor force that, by 1943, totaled over 18,000 
civilians.41  White settlers in Kenya took advantage of British colonial policy during World War 
II  to force more Kikuyu off of ancestral lands and into reserves. When the Mau Mua rebelled in 
the years after World War II, the reserves served as fruitful recruitment grounds for their cause.42 
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Beyond the continent, Africans served in combat and support roles in the European, 
Middle East, and Asian theaters of war.43  In Burma, for example, Great Britain sent three 
African divisions, totaling 120,000 men, to fight the Japanese.44  Of these three divisions, it is the 
11th East African Division (11th E. A.) that is most pertinent to this thesis, due to the roles of 
members from subordinate units on both sides of the Mau Mau conflict.  The 11th E. A. formed 
in 1943, out of the 11th and 12th African Divisions.  These two divisions were heavily involved in 
the Abyssinian Campaign that removed Italian forces from Ethiopia.45  The 11th E. A. primarily 
consisted of troops drawn from Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland (modern day Malawi), and 
Tanganyika (modern day Tanzania).  The backbone of the 11th E. A. was the KAR Regiment.  
Within the regiment were battalions formed along colonial lines, i.e. the 11th Kenya Battalion 
KAR, the 26th Tanganyika Battalion KAR, and the 44th Uganda Battalion KAR.  At the brigade 
level, though, the units mixed.  Per the above examples, these three battalions formed the 25th 
East African Brigade.  The 11th E. A. had three such brigades, divisional artillery, engineers, and 
various support units.46 
The King’s African Rifles 
The KAR formed in 1902.  Originally, it was comprised of six battalions, five of which 
came from pre-existing units.  The British enforced a color line from the inception of the KAR.  
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Officers were white Europeans and troops were black Africans.  As time went on, the British 
Army allowed Africans to fill some non-commissioned and junior officer ranks.47  The initial 
purpose of the KAR was colonial security.48  Battalions formed based on colonial territory and, 
only on rare occasions, did any mixing occur.  Both colonial administrators and tribal chiefs 
preferred this model.  This practice remained in place up through the 1950s.49  The KAR saw 
action in both World Wars and fought against the Mau Mau. 
At the start of the Second World War, the KAR comprised seven battalions, which 
contained 2,900 men.  As rifle battalions, their chief role still focused on colonial security and, 
after 1935, maintaining a sharp eye on Italian activity in Ethiopia.  By the wars end, the KAR 
grew to forty-three battalions of over 323,000 African soldiers that served all over the globe.50  
The KAR increased to such levels due to a massive recruiting campaign.  For the most part, 
Britain did not use blatant conscription to fill the ranks of the KAR.51  Instead, recruiters used 
coercive means to fill recruit quotas.  The use of coercion over conscription allowed Great 
Britain to deny allegations of force to fill the ranks.  Coercion tactics included pressuring tribal 
chiefs, the lure of adventure and money, the use of propaganda broadcasts and films, and 
offering the chance to prove one’s manhood.52  With the exception of soliciting tribal chiefs, 
these recruiting tactics were more severe versions of those used to recruit white soldiers into the 
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British army.  When the British used outright conscription, it targeted educated and literate 
Africans to fill technical positions within the KAR.  This demographic was less inclined to join 
the army due to coercive means.  Educated and literate Kenyans had greater opportunity in 
civilian life as compared to the less educated and illiterate.  As previously mentioned, the British 
relied on conscription to create a massive African civilian labor force.53 
The 11th Kenya Battalion of the King’s African Rifles 
In 1946, the 11th Kenya Battalion KAR (11th KAR) published a unit history.  The 
experiences of this battalion provide a historical basis for the stories of glory and valor that many 
Mau Mau generals claimed as their own.  The battalion formed in early 1941.  Recruits from 
Kenya formed most of the companies, though there was some supplementation of recruits from 
Uganda.54  The 11th KAR first saw action when they quelled fighting in Somalia after the defeat 
of the Italians in 1941.55  During 1942, they returned to Kenya for further training.  It was at this 
time that the 11th KAR upgraded from a group of rifle companies to a fully equipped front-line 
battalion.  This meant the addition of mortar and machine gun sections, as well as specialist 
units.56  Future Mau Mau leaders claimed this training as their first exposure to real weapons and 
tactics.  In mid-1943, the 11th KAR sailed to Ceylon (modern day Sri Lanka).57  Ceylon served as 
a staging and training area for their eventual deployment to the Burma Front. 
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The Allied goal in Burma was to wrest control of the area from the Japanese and restore 
an overland route to China.58  While in Burma, the 11th KAR encountered the enemy several 
times.  According to the unit history, their first major engagement occurred at a place called 
Habari Hill.  During a patrol of the area, a patrol from B Company came across an enemy 
position.  The company sent additional patrols to support them.  A firefight ensued as the 
Japanese withdrew to a stronger position, leaving behind a weapon and supply cache.  Over the 
next few days, as A and C Companies joined B, the 11th KAR cleared out the Japanese and 
renamed the area Jambo Hill.59   
The patrols, ambushes, counter-ambushes, and defensive tactics used by the 11th KAR to 
defeat the Japanese on Jambo Hill were, in their nature, the same as what the Mau Mau forest 
fighters used on Mount Kenya and the Aberdares.  But how many future Mau Mau trained and 
fought as infantrymen in the Second World War?   
Kikuyu and WWII Support Roles  
Waruhiu Itote, the future Mau Mau General China, was a member of the 36th Tanganyika 
Battalion, KAR.  He too served in Burma; however, not as an infantryman.  Despite his own 
boasts, he was a mess steward, likely attached to the 36th KAR from the East African Military 
Labor Service (EAMLS).60  Due to the nature of jungle warfare, though, it is entirely possible he 
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experienced combat, as he claims in his memoir.  He discusses the ferocity of the enemy, the 
spirit of men in combat, and the harsh jungle terrain.61  His experience alludes to an important, 
and according to Timothy Parsons, overlooked aspect of Mau Mau veterans of World War II.  
Few Kikuyu, and even fewer Mau Mau leaders, trained and fought as infantrymen in the Second 
World War.  Most of Mau Mau veterans of World War II served in non-combatant support 
units.62 
The reason for the lack of Kikuyu as infantrymen goes back to British recruiting practices 
within Kenya.  Two race-based factors framed the British recruitment of Africans in Kenya.  The 
first dealt with white Kenyan leadership.  Kenya was a settler colony and, as such, the 
maintenance of white rule was paramount.  British settlers were concerned with military-trained 
Africans, especially the Kikuyu, within their midst.  It was within the Kikuyu ancestral lands that 
most white Europeans settled.  Because of Kikuyu proximity to the white population, colonial 
leadership pushed for the recruitment of Kikuyu and other nearby tribes into labor and support 
units.63  The second factor dealt with the British belief in the colonial paradigm of martial races.  
This was the belief that certain tribes and peoples were predisposed to warfare and others were 
not.  The British military believed that unlike the Kamba people, for example, the Kikuyu were 
not of the build or disposition for combat.  In addition, many Kikuyu were literate and educated 
in colonial schools.  This meant the British saw the Kikuyu as well suited to clerical and 
logistical duties.64  While Parson’s work goes a long way to dispel the myth of the World War II 
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infantrymen turned Mau Mau warrior, it also helps explain the occurrence of homemade 
firearms. 
Pulling the trigger of a homemade firearm at close range does not depend on extensive 
tactical military training.  Their conception and construction are the remarkable aspects of these 
weapons.  The ability to field such a firearm relies on the resources to build and distribute it.  
Gun makers constructed homemade firearms from pieces of local infrastructure.  A major 
necessity for funneling these parts from urban areas to gun factories in the forests were 
individuals trained in logistics.  Once the parts arrived, skilled mechanics were necessary to 
design and construct the guns.  The Mau Mau relied on logistics once again to distribute these 
guns to the fighters in the field.  All the while, administrative oversight helped ensure 
organization and accountability.  Logistics, mechanics, and administration were the support 
positions that educated Kikuyu individuals filled during the Second World War. 
As members of the EAMLS and the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC), Mau Mau 
leaders trained in the unsung skills of warfare.  Some, like Itote, found themselves attached to 
front line units, such as the 11th and 36th KAR.  In the process, the terrain and the enemy blurred 
the line between combatant and noncombatant.  In the jungle, without proper infantry training, 
they developed some ability to survive and fight.  Other Mau Mau leaders who served in the 
EAMLS and the AAPC stayed within Kenya.  In the process, they gained knowledge of the 
British military’s standards and practices.  This was invaluable knowledge to have during the 
Uprising, as the Mau Mau fought the British army and the KAR.  No doubt, many Mau Mau 
fighters exaggerated their experiences in World War II to gain prestige and leadership roles.  




freedom.  More specifically, though, their training in the support aspects of war greatly 
facilitated the Mau Mau’s ability to produce homemade firearms. 
Part Two: The Need for Homemade Guns 
It was in the immediate post-World War II years that the Mau Mau movement began in 
Kenya.  Their numbers were small in the beginning, which meant theft or illegal purchase of 
firearms was enough to arm Mau Mau fighters.  Henry Kahinga Wachanga, who served as a Mau 
Mau General Secretary from 1952 to 1955, describes such procurement methods in his 1975 
autobiography.  As Wachanga recalls, Mau Mau raiders targeted the shops and homes of non-
Africans.  The Mau Mau then funneled the stolen weapons to the forests for disbursement among 
the troops.65  Waruhiu Itote, better known by his nom de guerre General China, boasted of 
stealing seven guns by himself prior to 1952.66  However, a few factors developed as the 
Uprising went on that made such methods insufficient.  The growth of the Mau Mau movement, 
the effective counterinsurgency tactics of the British, and the lack of an outside state sponsor to 
supply weapons challenged the Mau Mau ability to arm KLFA fighters.  This section will focus 
on those factors, as well as argue the prominence and importance of the homemade guns used to 
overcome such challenges. 
Much of the specific information about these homemade guns comes from the 
autobiography and interrogation of Itote.  As a general, he was a ranking member of the Mau 
Mau movement.  Itote commanded KLFA in the Mount Kenya and Nyeri sectors, second only to 
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the supreme military leader of the movement, Dedan Kimethi.67  As a young man, Itote fought 
for the British in World War II as part of the 36th King’s African Rifles (KAR).  Stationed in 
Tanganyika (present day Tanzania), the unit deployed to Ceylon (present day Sri Lanka) for 
training.  Itote saw combat in Burma, as the KAR was integral to the Allied effort in expelling 
the Japanese from the British colony.68  According to Itote, it was his time serving abroad that 
began his questioning of colonial rule.  In the beginning of his autobiography, Mau Mau 
General, Itote recalls two seminal conversations in his life.  The first occurred with a white 
English soldier.  They talked of nationalism and the war effort.  The English soldier suggested 
that Itote reconsider his motivations for fighting with the British to secure their empire.  The 
second conversation was with an African American soldier.  They talked of Christianity and of 
identity.  Itote claims he had many more conversations like these during the war, but these two 
talks caused him to begin identifying as a Kenyan and opening his eyes to a wider world.69  This 
foundation helped to place Itote in a position of leadership within the movement and as an 
authority on its homemade guns. 
Not Enough Guns to Go Around 
According to Itote, it was the growth of their movement and the commencement of 
attacks on Europeans that drove the demand for guns beyond the black market and theft.70  In 
addition to growth of the Mau Mau, the weapons supply within the cities began to dry up.  
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Colonial government forces recognized how the Mau Mau obtained precision weapons and made 
efforts to clamp down on the sources.  In round up operations, such as Operation Jock Scott, 
colonial government forces casted a wide net and pulled Mau Mau leadership and any suspected 
supporters off the street.71  The colonial government also set up checkpoints in order to stop and 
search anyone suspected of Mau Mau sympathies.  The British did not exclude Kenyan women 
from these tactics.  Indeed, many Kikuyu women were members of the Mau Mau Passive 
Wing.72  This was the Mau Mau support element that worked in urban areas and the reserves.  In 
addition to smuggling weapons, the Passive Wing moved information, food, and other supplies 
to the Militant Wing, the fighters in the forest.73  To effectively search those suspected of being 
Mau Mau, the British enlisted European and African women into the Kenya Police Reserve.74 
Another constraint on the supply of precision firearms was the lack of external support 
for the Mau Mau movement.  Within the context of the Cold War, it was common for rebellions 
to ally themselves to larger ideologies.  In doing so, they garnered favor from the two global 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.  Mau Mau was an exception to this 
standard.  There are several reasons for this isolation.  First off, this was a rebellion in a British 
colony in Africa.  Because of long-standing political relationships, the U.S. feared that 
supporting such a rebellion would undermine British colonial authority. Ebere Nwaubani, in his 
book The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, argues that the United 
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States had a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the European colonial powers in Africa.75  
Secondly, even though certain Kenyan leaders spent time in the Soviet Union, the Russians 
viewed the Mau Mau “as an alienated and backward tribal uprising.”76  This was also prior to the 
Khrushchev policy of supporting all African liberation struggles.  This policy came into effect in 
1961, when Kenya was already on the path to a negotiated independence from Great Britain.77  
British authorities were aware that the Mau Mau enjoyed no Soviet support and did their best to 
suppress any rumors to the contrary.  It was in the British interest to maintain the perception that 
this was a domestic dispute instigated by tribal upstarts.  Thus, the British decision to call the 
situation in Kenya an emergency and not a rebellion, revolt, or war.  In their opinion, increased 
global attention or involvement could only exacerbate a tenuous situation.  When it came to the 
supply of arms, the Public Relations Office in Nairobi rebuffed all claims and rumors of Soviet 
supply.78  The Mau Mau also could not rely on supply from neighboring African states and 
territories.  At the time, Ethiopia was the only independent African state adjacent to Kenya.  
According to General China, he sent teams to smuggle weapons and ammunition into Kenya 
from Ethiopia, but these attempts were perilous and often unsuccessful.  Ethiopian border troops 
engaged these teams, costing lives and time.79  The remaining territory surrounding Kenya 
comprised of colonies controlled by Great Britain and Italy.  The aforementioned factors, 
combined with Mau Mau oathing procedures and brutal tactics, isolated the movement from 
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external support.  It was in this environment that General China and other Mau Mau leaders 
began to develop homemade firearms. 
Prominence and Importance of the Homemade Guns  
In January 1954, General China led some of his men to a weapons cache in order to 
rearm.  Prior to obtaining the weapons, colonial police and KAR troops engaged this contingent 
of Mau Mau.  Shot during the firefight, China had little choice but to surrender to the KAR 
troops.80  Shortly after his capture, China underwent a lengthy interrogation conducted by 
Assistant Superintendent of Police Ian Henderson.  Henderson was uniquely qualified to perform 
this duty.  Though he was a European by birth, his parents raised him in Nyeri.  As a youth, he 
became fluent in the language of the Kikuyu.81  During the Uprising, he worked with Special 
Branch.  His chief mission was to infiltrate Mau Mau gangs and persuade them to turn to the side 
of the Government.  His interrogation of General China led to the greatest understanding of Mau 
Mau movements and organization that the British would have during the conflict. 
Per his interrogation, China claimed his factory produced an average of forty-two rifles 
per week at the time of his capture.82  Based on this rate of production and additional information 
divulged by China, Henderson put the total number of homemade guns in the Mount Kenya 
region at 1,250. This estimation placed homemade guns at seventy-five per cent of all Mau Mau 
firearms in the area.83  Indeed, one should avoid applying these numbers directly to all the areas 
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that the Mau Mau operated.  This high percentage does suggest, however, that homemade guns 
were by far the most prominent firearm issued to the Mau Mau fighter. 
It is clear from the source material that Mau Mau fighters, such as General China, were 
extremely proud of their achievement in arms production.  From the perspective of Mau Mau 
leadership, the homemade guns were necessary in order to offer any level of resistance to the 
British.  On the other side of the conflict, though, it appears that a change in the British 
perception of these guns has occurred over time.  Primary sources from the time and immediately 
after the Uprising show an appreciation for these weapons, at least for their lethality if not their 
ingenuity.  Indeed, the British featured these weapons in anti-Mau Mau propaganda.84   
Since the end of hostilities, non-Kenyan writers overlooked the weapons.  They were no 
longer tools of war but labeled as ceremonial and symbolic.85  The first works on the topic of 
Mau Mau focused on the British end of the struggle.  Indeed, many of these books came out 
during the Emergency itself.  Leigh’s In the Shadow of the Mau Mau, McDougall’s African 
Turmoil, and Stoneham’s Out of Barbarism all paint a picture of African savagery and British 
civility.  Works, such as these, helped to establish the early narrative of Great Britain crushing 
the rebellion of the Mau Mau and establishing the required level of civilization for an 
independent Kenya.  The homemade guns do not make any real appearance in these works.  
Potential reasons for this could be a lack of awareness by the authors or a willingness to overlook 
any level of skill in their adversary.   
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The homemade firearms gained prominence in British writing with the debut of 
biographies and autobiographies of individuals who fought the Mau Mau.  The most prominent 
of such works is the autobiography of Ian Henderson.  In addition to his interrogation of General 
China, Henderson pursued Dedan Kimathi, the military leader of the Mau Mau.  This search is 
the focal point of his book, coauthored by Philip Goodhart, entitled The Hunt for Kimathi.  
Henderson had a keen awareness and combatant’s appreciation for these guns.  During his 
pursuit of men like China and Kimathi, he engaged with Mau Mau fighters.  On at least one 
occasion, he received a gunshot wound in his left arm.86  Statistically speaking, this bullet very 
likely came from a homemade gun.  In a more peaceful interaction with a group of Mau Mau 
fighters, Henderson offered a detailed description and analysis of these homemade firearms.  
“Some were homemade guns which had been manufactured with an undisputed ingenuity from 
length of piping, bicycle frames, and scraps of wire and metal they had found lying about the 
countryside, but these were often more dangerous for the man who fired them than their 
target.”87  This single sentence says a great deal.  First, Henderson acknowledges the ingenuity of 
these guns.  He used similar terms previously heard from General China.  This is at least one 
example of a European appreciating these African firearms.  Second, he corroborates China’s 
description of materials used to make the guns.  This suggests that the components were 
recognizable in their new form.  Last, Henderson reaffirms their danger to the shooter.  
Potentially, this meeting took place early on, before the weapons became safer.  Another, more 
likely, possibility is that the stigma of danger remained attached to these weapons despite 
improvements. 
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Four years after the Emergency ended, another book written about a British officer whose 
mission was to infiltrate the Mau Mau debuted.  Entitled Bwana Drum, it told the story of David 
Drummond.  The author, Dennis Holman, conducted extensive interviews with Drummond and 
his associates in order to write this book.  Holman tells the stories of gun factory raids, provides 
a complete description of homemade guns, and states that the rank and file Mau Mau fighter 
carried a homemade gun.  Indeed, it was this type of weapon that they most associated with their 
movement, allowing them to identify as a true forest fighter.88  In addition, Holman makes it 
clear that Drummond regarded the importance of homemade guns when he sent out teams to 
infiltrate Mau Mau units.  A key aspect to the team blending in were the improvised guns.  
Drummond recognized that a lack of homemade guns would give them away as outsiders.89 
Both works provide excellent firsthand accounts of engagements with the Mau Mau.  In 
many respects, they are the British versions of Itote’s autobiography.  In that regard, it is 
plausible to assume some hyperbole and exaggeration of events.  Envisioning these works as a 
Venn diagram, though, helps to elucidate some potential truths.  All three demonstrate great 
respect for homemade guns as weapons.  There is no discussion of them as ceremonial pieces.  
Both Itote and Henderson make extremely similar descriptions of these weapons.  In Holman and 
Itote, the pride the fighters have for these guns is apparent.  In many ways, the homemade gun is 
the Mau Mau calling card.  Such commonalties make clear the prominence and importance of 
homemade guns as tools of war in the Mau Mau Uprising. 
 
88 Holman, Bwana Drum, 34, 50, 84. 




The homemade guns manufactured by the Mau Mau are an important example of agency 
on behalf of an oppressed people.  Those committed to the Mau Mau cause found a unique way 
to obtain items that they otherwise could not.  They did not have an external state sponsor to 
supply their cause with arms and aid.  The firearm restrictions in place in Colonial Kenya 
effectively disarmed them before there was a rebellion.  Once in a state of emergency, the 
regulations tightened further, effectively shutting down the black market.  Resorting to theft did 
not cover the gap.  Where similar initiatives might have crumbled, the Mau Mau found another 
way.  They rapidly developed and constructed their own firearms.  Production was large enough 
that these guns became the primary firearms of the KLFA fighter.  As such, these weapons 
helped to dictate both Mau Mau and British tactics.  They also hold an important place in Mau 





CHAPTER TWO: MAU MAU HOMEMADE GUN 
TECHNOLOGY AND TACTICS 
   The Mau Mau created a unique weapon in their homemade guns.  They used local 
resources to source parts and constructed the guns in factories deep in the forest.  Once in the 
hands of Mau Mau fighters, the homemade guns influenced the type of tactics employed by 
KLFA.  The following chapter contains two sections.  The first section details the technological 
aspects of the homemade firearms, namely their sourcing, construction, and mechanics.  The 
section also details how the Mau Mau overcame ammunition and explosives shortfalls.  The 
second section focuses on the chronic precision firearms shortage during the Uprising.  It argues 
that this shortage drove Mau Mau operations to procure more weapons and, in the process, their 
homemade guns tactically influenced how the Mau Mau carried out these operations. 
Part One: Homemade Gun Technology 
In order to understand how the Mau Mau used their homemade guns, it is important to 
explain the technology behind the guns.  Using Mau Mau logistical channels, gun parts traveled 
to factories in the foothills and forests.  Within the factories, engineers constructed and tested 
homemade firearms.  This section details the methods the Mau Mau used to source parts for their 
homemade guns.  It also describes the construction process and the mechanical operation of the 




Sourcing, Construction, and Mechanics 
According to General China’s autobiography, in early 1953 the idea to construct firearms 
occurred to him and his comrades.90  Because even the parts to make firearms were so difficult to 
come by, these gun makers looked to resources more readily at hand.  China described the 
sourcing for these parts in the following way: 
The stock itself was fashioned from the wood of the Muthiti or Thirikwa tree, 
which never cracks under any weather conditions.  The barrel, generally made 
from water pipe, was fastened to this, and a smaller pipe or piece of iron, one 
which would fit smoothly within the barrel, was used as a hammer.  The hammer 
was released by a mechanism built out of a barbed wire spring and a piece of car 
or bicycle tube.91 
The components of these homemade guns came from sources readily found in Kenya’s natural 
and urban environments.  Itote also speaks to the ingenuity of these gun makers.  From easily 
found items, the manufacture of rifles, shotguns, and pistols took place.  Though rudimentary in 
their parts, combining them created a simple to use and lethal weapon. 
 The examples of these homemade guns housed at the IWM in London corroborate 
China’s description (See Figure 1).92  They present a good cross section of the types of firearms 
made by the Mau Mau.  They all feature a hard-wooden stock and a smooth bore barrel made of 
water or gas pipe.  The seven rifles inspected have an average overall length of 91.14 cm.  The 
average barrel length is 44 cm.  All but two fire with a “sling-shot” method.  That is to say, the 
operator pulls a bolt or firing pin back against a spring or rubber strap and releases the pin to fire 
the round.  Most contain a feature to hold a loaded round in place.  This is typically a metal clip 
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or collar slipped over the end of a cartridge.  They all lack sights for target acquisition, thus 
suggesting a short-range point and shoot type weapon.  These limitations go well with 
Wachanga’s descriptions of Mau Mau ambushes.93 
 
Figure 2: Example of simple Mau Mau homemade firearm.94 
 
Their inherent danger to the shooter is also apparent.  The combination of water pipe and 
smooth fitting iron may effectively ignite a cartridge, but a misfire was also possible.  A misfire 
can occur when there is an improper seal around the cartridge, allowing gas and fire to escape the 
firing chamber.  Such an event could cause these weapons to explode, potentially injuring the 
operator.  This danger is more apparent when one examines the specific pipes used to construct 
the barrels.  One such example housed at the IWM uses a length of seamed pipe for the barrel.95  
As opposed to pipe milled as a tube from the start, seamed pipe starts as a flat strip.  A metal 
worker bends the strip into a circular tube and then welds the tube at the seam.96  This creates a 
serviceable water pipe, but a structurally weak gun barrel.  It is no surprise that this particular 
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example has a barrel rupture in the firing chamber.  China was extremely aware of these dangers, 
particularly with the early models.  Due to the danger and lack of durability over time, standard 
practice required that each gun only fire twenty-five rounds.97  It is unclear if an armorer refit or 
destroyed the firearm at this point.  One suspects that, due to the severe shortage of firearms, all 
salvageable parts from a gun were repurposed to a new weapon.  The severity of punishment for 
the loss of a firearm and the Mau Mau’s attention to firearm maintenance and cleanliness helps 
to substantiate this assessment.98 
 After the construction of some prototypes, China opened a gun factory at his headquarters 
on Mount Kenya.  According to his description, he began this operation with twenty engineers 
and added to their ranks from the companies under his command.  An individual named Ruku 
served as the foreman and production of these guns became rapid and, somewhat, standardized.99  
Overtime, China increased the number of engineers and innovations took place.  The most 
common innovation was an improved trigger mechanism.  The IWM has two examples of such 
an improvement.100  Instead of the “sling-shot” method of igniting a round, these examples 
involve triggers and springs that release the firing pin into the cartridge.  In lesser numbers, 
China’s factory developed magazine fed rifles.101  The IWM has a few examples of magazine fed 
rifles but describes the magazine of at least one as a “dummy.”  This particular weapon, though, 
constructed by Simon Peter Ngatia Macharia (General Doctor Russia), may not have been made 
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under the direction of General China (See Figure 2). 102  The magazine area is lacking a spring to 
elevate the next round into the firing chamber.  It is possible that this weapon once contained a 
spring that is now missing.  This weapon also shows another level of sophistication.  It contains a 
working bolt action with a firing pin.  While most of the weapons viewed at the IWM rely on a 
nail secured by a spring or rubber strap to strike a round, this one conceals the striker in a bolt 
(See Figure 3).  This creates a safer firing mechanism than other examples and demonstrates a 
sophisticated level of engineering. 
 
 
Figure 3: Mau Mau homemade firearm, built by General Doctor Russia, with “dummy magazine.”103 
 
 
Figure 4: Mau Mau homemade bolt and firing pin, built by General Doctor Russia.  104 
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Of note is the homemade pistol housed at the IWM (See figure 4).105  General China 
considered pistols too unsafe to the shooter.  On his orders, gunmakers manufactured very few 
pistols.106  The pistol held at the IWM is an apparent exception.  It is a hybrid of homemade and 
premanufactured parts.  It features a rifled barrel from a .22 caliber pistol.  Based on the barrel’s 
style and length, it likely came from a revolver.  It has a front sight, unlike the other homemade 
weapons found at the IWM.  The barrel rests on a hinge, which swings open “shotgun style” in 
order to load a round.  The weapon also contains a premanufactured hammer, possibly from the 
same initial weapon that the barrel came from.  The stock and grip are original parts carved from 
wood.  It also features a functioning trigger and safety.  One speculates that this piece belonged 
to a high-ranking individual, as it is a handgun and made from premanufactured parts. 
 
Figure 5: Mau Mau homemade pistol.107 
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Ammunition and Explosives 
While the Mau Mau saw great success in constructing their own firearms, an obstacle that 
was more difficult to overcome was the acquisition of ammunition.  The design of their 
homemade guns called for a modern cartridge, just as European manufactured firearms did.  
After the British declared a state of emergency, if colonial authorities found an African in 
possession of even a single round of ammunition the punishment was death.108  Such a danger 
heightened the scarcity of available ammunition for the Mau Mau to obtain.  In the beginning of 
the Uprising, gunmakers test fired homemade guns before issuing them to fighters.  As 
ammunition scarcity grew, this practice ended.109   
According to China, the Mau Mau could not produce their own ammunition as they did 
firearms.110  They also did not have the capability to reload spent rifle and pistol casings with 
new projectiles and propellant.  British service rifles of the time primarily fired a .303 caliber 
rifle round.  This made the .303 the most common type of ammunition in the area.  Therefore, 
Mau Mau gun makers endeavored to build firearms to support this caliber round.  The British 
were aware of this fact and placed ammunition security at the highest priority.111 
Theft and the black market did supply some relief, but the Mau Mau employed a few 
more creative ways to overcome the ammunition shortage.  Primarily, the Mau Mau filed down 
larger ammunition or packed wading around smaller ammunition to fit their homemade weapons.  
The second path they pursued worked best for shotgun ammunition, as it was easier to 
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manipulate without negatively affecting its use.  Engineers at China’s gun factory would open a 
shotgun cartridge and remove a portion of its gunpowder within.  They would then use it to fill 
other shotgun shells, making up the difference with crushed glass.112  According to Wachanga, 
Dedan Kimathi ordered gun makers to mix ground up ivory into their gunpowder.  Kimathi 
claimed that doing so would ensure their rounds fired properly.113  Perhaps this was superstition, 
as there does not appear to be a practical reason behind this method. The most elaborate tactic 
involved spent casings found after a battle.  China, and likely other commanders, directed 
fighters to retrieve these valuable objects.  They would then trade the empty brass for fresh 
ammunition with KAR troops who were sympathetic to the Mau Mau cause.  The KAR troops 
would conceal the transaction by claiming they consumed all their rounds in a firefight and 
needed to restock on ammunition.114  
In addition to manufacturing firearms and modifying ammunition, Mau Mau engineers 
constructed hand grenades.  According to Wachanga, engineers would fill a can with 
“gunpowder, broken glass, stones, and petrol.”115  They then inserted a flammable wick for 
ignition.  Thus, creating a particularly nasty improvised explosive device.  It is likely that this 
device would vary in size.  Smaller cans, such as soup or vegetable cans, lent well to hand 
grenades.  Larger cans created larger explosives.  Wachanga claims the lethal range of these 
hand grenades was forty square yards.116  If this is an accurate assessment, these improvised 
hand grenades were much more lethal than a modern hand grenade.  A modern hand grenade has 
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a lethal range of about 6 square yards.117  It is probably more accurate to describe Wachanga’s 
forty square yard estimate as the weapon’s casualty producing radius.  The casualty radius is the 
range in which the density of shrapnel exploding out from the grenade is enough to cause serious 
injury.  Regardless of the specifics, these were lethal weapons used to good effect by the Mau 
Mau, particularly in tight quarters and ambushes.118 
Part Two: How Firearm Acquisition and Homemade Guns Dictated Tactics 
As an insurgency, the people and resources the Mau Mau could bring to their cause 
limited their strategic goals.  Plainly, their primary goal aimed at the restoration of Kikuyu land 
and the independence of Kenya.  To understand their enemy, the British military published the 
Handbook on Mau Mau Operations.  In it, the British offered their definition of Mau Mau 
strategic goals, which “is to expand the security threat to an extent which will be beyond the 
capacity of Government to contain.  The strategical aim has the ultimate objective of forcing 
Government to meet Kikuyu political demands.”119  To this end, the Mau Mau movement 
comprised a Militant Wing and a Political Wing.  Initially, the Political Wing led the movement 
towards it strategic aims.  Mau Mau’s political leaders laid an ideological foundation in the years 
leading up to the declaration of the Emergency.120  Early colonial government action targeted 
and then arrested men believed to be Mau Mau political leadership in Operation Jock Scott.  
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Thus, the heads of the Militant Wing, already operating in the forests, were the only leaders left 
in the field.  From this point on, the Militant Wing began to direct the movement.121 
The Handbook on Mau Mau Operations also provides a definition for the tactical goals of 
the Mau Mau: “to expand its military forces and deploy them to the extent necessary to achieve 
the strategical aim.”122  The following section focuses on the Militant Wing’s ability to prosecute 
these tactical aims.  It argues that the procurement and construction of firearms became a chief 
focus of Mau Mau tactical operations outside of the forest, therefore limiting the ability to 
achieve strategic aims overtime.  Woven throughout this section are British counter-insurgency 
efforts to curtail these operations. 
Battles for Weapons to Fight More Battles 
As early as 1948, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), a political predecessor to the 
Mau Mau movement, began stockpiling arms and ammunition.  The British banned the KCA at 
the outset of the Second World War in an attempt to consolidate power within the colony.  Post-
war, certain members of the KCA saw an armed rebellion as the only way to gain Kenyan 
independence.  KCA members and sympathizers exploited lax ammunition dump security and 
poorly enforced firearm laws to obtain these items.  They acquired nearly 400 firearms and well 
over 100,000 rounds of ammunition between 1948 and 1952.123  When the British government 
declared the a state of emergency in 1952, new firearm laws went into effect.  At the same time, 
 
121 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 42. 
122 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 35. 




though, the civilian populace increasingly carried firearms for protection.  Mau Mau and Kikuyu 
sympathetic to the movement targeted these people and their homes to obtain firearms.124 
According to Waruhiu Itote, Mau Mau youths preferred the rural homes of Europeans.  
At the point of a panga, many Europeans surrendered their firearms without a fight.  Itote goes 
on to brag that he personally acquired seven weapons in 1952 in this manner.125  Itote often 
overemphasizes Mau Mau exploits, but the scenario he describes is plausible.  The statistics in 
Corfield’s Origins and Growth of Mau Mau demonstrate the Mau Mau ability to obtain stolen 
weapons in the beginning of the Uprising, even if they had a difficult time holding on to them.  
Government authorities recovered the majority of weapons lost or stolen in any given year 
during the state of emergency.126  Especially after Operation Anvil in 1954, the acquisition of 
firearms became a major focus of Mau Mau raids.127  As Itote states, “At times our shortage of 
weapons made our activities seem like a series of battles to get weapons to fight more battles.”128 
Raids for weapons and supplies became the chief operational method for Mau Mau 
fighters.  Since they had to leave the forest for a raid, they were also the most dangerous 
operations to undertake.  While in the forest, the Mau Mau were able to move about silently and 
keep out of sight.  This forced British and colonial troops to search the Mau Mau out, often with 
little success.  According to oral histories conducted in the 1980s of former KAR British officers, 
forest patrols rarely encountered any Mau Mau fighters.  In their opinion, the area was too vast 
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and their numbers too small to cover it effectively.129  However, when the Mau Mau raided urban 
areas, contact between both sides was commonplace. 
Two of the more infamous raids are the attacks on the Naivasha Police station in 1953 
and the Lukenya Prison in1954.  Dedan Kimathi, the highest ranked Mau Mau fighter in the 
Aberdares, led the raid on Naivasha.  In this single raid, the Mau Mau obtained forty-seven 
precision weapons, including eighteen machine guns, and 3,780 rounds of ammunition.130  The 
attack on the Naivasha Police Station proved to be the most successful raid pulled off by the Mau 
Mau during the Uprising.  It also cemented the status of Kimathi as the military leader of the 
forest fighters. The raid on Lukenya Prison, while not as successful as Naivasha, was the largest 
raid put together by Mau Mau fighters active in Nairobi.  The Mau Mau committed three of their 
generals and over one hundred fighters to this raid.  With them, they carried thirty rifles, six Bren 
submachine guns, and five pistols.  The raid was a great show of force and led to the acquisition 
of weapons, ammunition, and uniforms.131 
Not all raids were as successful though.  Many proved to be more trouble than they were 
worth.  Of these, the failed raid in near Mathira in January of 1954 hurt the Mau Mau cause 
unlike any other.  During the preparations for this raid, government forces wounded and captured 
Waruhiu Itote, then known as General China.  Colonial police and a KAR battalion discovered 
Itote and his men; at that point, a firefight erupted.132  Because of a chronic precision firearms 
shortage, the Mau Mau risked much to obtain more guns.  Not only did this failed raid remove 
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Itote from the battlefield, but also, because he survived, it allowed him to become an intelligence 
asset for the British.  In an interrogation that lasted sixty-eight hours, Itote divulged the inner 
working of the Mau Mau organization.133  It was the single greatest intelligence achievement of 
the conflict.  In an attempt to expand their military forces, the Mau Mau lost one of their most 
experienced generals. 
Close Quarters Combat 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the decreasing ability to acquire precision firearms 
was one of the causal factors that drove the Mau Mau to develop their homemade guns.  Just as 
the scarcity of these weapons dictated raiding tactics, so too did the homemade firearms.  The 
smoothbore of the homemade gun required the operator to fire at close range.134  Additionally, 
most of the homemade weapons required manual reloading.  After each successive shot, the 
danger of an accidental discharge increased.  This is because the increase in the weapon’s 
temperature could prematurely detonate the gunpowder in a cartridge.  Not only could this cause 
the gun to fire when the shooter was not ready, it could also injure the shooter or a comrade.135 
Mau Mau leadership took all these potential dangers into consideration when it came to 
the tactical implementation of these homemade firearms.  According to Henry Wachanga, a Mau 
Mau fighter in the Aberdares, there were several standing orders regarding firearm usage.  For 
example, no one was to fire any rounds unless ordered to by a superior.  This helped to ensure 
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the element of surprise in an ambush or raid.  Once given the order to fire, Mau Mau fighters 
fired only one round, unless specifically ordered otherwise.  This helped to mitigate the dangers 
of an accidental discharge and conserve limited ammunition.  Each fighter carried five rounds of 
spare ammunition.  These extra rounds were only for pressing a victory or covering a retreat.  
Lastly, the loss of a weapon was punishable by death.136  It is hard to know how rigidly Mau 
Mau leaders enforced these rules.  It does seem clear from the oral histories of British soldiers 
that the Mau Mau preferred ambushes and broke contact quickly.137 
Within the forest, the ambush was the Mau Mau tactic of choice for engaging with their 
enemy.  A common method of guerilla forces around the world, ambushes allowed the Mau Mau 
to dictate the location and duration of contact.  This ability is important when fighting an enemy 
with superior weaponry and technology.  In The Swords of Kirinyaga, Henry Wachanga 
described the typical Mau Mau ambush, 
We would ambush them with ease, for we placed guards at all entrances into the 
forest.  When the enemy approached, these guards would move quickly away and 
report the number of approaching enemy and the type of weapons they carried.  
The leader would then delegate a number larger than that of the enemy to ambush 
them.  The remainder of the Mau Mau would then go to about half a mile from 
camp, leaving only sentinels to mark whether or not the enemy discovered the 
camp.  The ambush would be quickly laid along the foot-path the enemy was 
using.  It would be at a place of dense forest which afforded good cover.  The 
Mau Mau Fighters would hide very close to the path at regular intervals.  One 
ambusher would be placed about one hundred yards farther along the path.  He 
would be armed with a .303 rifle with a tin can attached to the muzzle.  When 
fired, it sounded like a mortar and made the enemies drop to the ground very 
quickly.  He would not fire until the enemies were all even with the Mau Mau 
hiding along the path.  After he fired his single shot, and the security forces 
dropped down, the Mau Mau along the path leaped from their hiding places and 
either opened fire at close range, or slashed them with their mabanga.  A man 
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with a bugle was the first man along our line of hidden Mau Mau.  He began to 
blow the bugle as the ambush began.  Should any soldier attempt to scape h would 
be thrown into confusion and plunge deeper into the forest rather than run towards 
the bugler.  The forest was like a house to us, but was a torture chamber to the 
security forces.138 
Within this scenario, Wachanga demonstrates Mau Mau tactical superiority and control of the 
battlefield within the forest.  Two key factors that create this situation for the Mau Mau are 
knowledge of the terrain and intelligence of the enemy situation.  As a guerilla force fighting in 
their homeland, the Mau Mau have natural terrain knowledge.  Wachanga details this asset when 
he talks of guards at the forest entrances, the Mau Mau’s ability to know the security force’s path 
of travel, the use of the densest section of that path for cover and concealment, and the scattering 
of security forces deeper into the forest.  The guards also act as intelligence collectors when they 
report to their leader the size and armament of the approaching force.  This intelligence report 
allows the Mau Mau leadership to decide whether to engage their enemy and deploy their forces 
appropriately.  It is important to note that Wachanga states that Mau Mau leadership deployed a 
larger force than the one approaching.  Arguably, this was not always possible.  One surmises 
that if fighter suppository was not possible, the Mau Mau remained hidden. 
 In Wachanga’s scenario, however, the Mau Mau set up and sprung the ambush.  He 
describes a basic linear ambush.  In such an ambush, the assault team lines up along the enemy’s 
avenue of approach.  Security units protect the assault team’s flanks and rear.  When the enemy 
enters the kill zone, the assault team opens fire and engages the enemy.139  In addition to these 
standard tactics, Mau Mau ambushes contained some unique aspects as well.  The simulated 
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mortar fire helped to close a gap in fire support.  As Wachanga described, the sound of mortar 
fire was enough to make security forces take cover and signal the assault team to open fire.  It is 
likely that the firearms used by the bulk of the assault team were homemade.  Wachanga alludes 
to them when describing the ambush taking place at close range and the use of mabangas, a type 
of machete.  The bugler is a third unique aspect.  The standard linear ambush can use a support 
element to press a victory within the kill zone.140  The bugler, like the simulated mortar, serves as 
a faint of such a support unit.  The bugler tricks the security forces into thinking they cannot 
escape in the direction they came because more Mau Mau could be in that direction.  Therefore, 
to flee the kill zone, they disperse into the deeper areas of the forest.  The bugler creates 
uncertainty and confusion, increasing the Mau Mau ambush effectiveness.  Despite the Mau 
Mau’s fire and technology inferiority, their use of terrain, intelligence, and buglers allowed them 
to create a torture chamber in the forest. 
The Dichotomy of the Homemade Guns 
Because senior Mau Mau leadership largely rested in the Militant Wing after October 
1952, larger political goals took a back seat to military objectives.  This is not to say that military 
leadership was not ideological, in fact this led to many disagreements at the highest levels, but 
prosecuting an insurgency from the forests prevented ideological leaders from achieving political 
goals in urban areas.  Effective counter-insurgency methods enacted by the British further 
hemmed in Mau Mau military capabilities.  These factors drove the KLFA to take increasingly 
risky actions at the tactical level, often for not much reward.  Despite their logistical and 
 




engineering abilities to craft and field homemade firearms, the need for precision weaponry and 
ammunition became an overarching priority for Mau Mau leadership.  The need for precision 
weaponry influenced the type of offensive mission Mau Mau fighters undertook and their 
homemade guns narrowed the scope of their capabilities within said mission.  Within the forest, 
Mau Mua fighters held the tactical advantage.  Their ability to ambush British patrols left the 
forests as the last held terrain of the Mau Mau Uprising.  Forest ambushes, however, were 
defensive maneuvers.  They relied on the British patrolling into a kill zone.  As Mau Mau 
numbers declined, less contact occurred in this manner.  The arms and ammunition expended in 
ambushes drove the Mau Mau to conduct offensive raids to supply defensive ambushes.  Thus, 
the homemade guns fostered a dichotomy between tactical abilities and strategic goals.  The 
chronic lack of precision weaponry created a space for the homemade gun to flourish, but at the 





CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE 
HOMEMADE GUNS 
 Historians began to take notice of memory in the 1980s, following a growth in public 
interest for autobiography, family genealogical history, and museum studies.141  As historical 
memory gained use professionally, scholars debated its usefulness and accuracy.  Supporters of 
using historical memory saw a way to engage with new sources and amplify their research.  
Detractors saw subjective information that flew in the face of objective historical research.142  In 
many ways, historians of Africa have embraced historical memory.  African peoples have a rich 
oral tradition that has passed a collective memory down through generations.  Scholars who 
pursued this as a source found ways to fill gaps in the traditional historical record.  Jan Vansina 
developed the methodology for studying oral tradition and treating it as history.  Published in 
1985, his Oral Tradition as History laid the foundation for all subsequent studies of African oral 
history.143  Anne Bailey used this type of research to great effect in her study of Eweland on the 
former Slave Coast of Africa.  She used oral tradition and collective memory to add to the 
history of the Atlantic Slave Trade.144 
Memory and oral history are also useful when groups or individuals destroy traditional 
historical sources.  This was the case of Caroline Elkins’ research in Kenya.  While researching 
Imperial Reckoning, she discovered that when the British left Kenya they destroyed their records 
on a grand scale.  This left her with many questions regarding the detention complex the British 
established during the Mau Mau Emergency.  She interviewed hundreds of former Mau Mau 
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adherents to uncover their history.145  For the purpose of this thesis, I used memoirs and oral 
histories to place the homemade guns within the historical memory of Mau Mau.  My research 
demonstrates that the guns are, for different reasons, important to both Mau Mau and British 
memory.  I also attempted to strip away the extreme bias of both sides and find a balanced 
memory of the guns. 
 Scholars have written academic works focusing on the historical memory of the Mau 
Mau, but nothing specific to the memory of homemade guns.  One excellent example is Robert 
Buijtenhuijs’ Mau Mau Twenty Years After. In that work, he explored how the memory and myth 
of Mau Mau influenced Kenyan politics and discourse in the two decades following 
independence.  Marshal S. Clough’s Mau Mau Memoirs is another groundbreaking work on this 
subject.  He used memoirs written by Mau Mau as primary sources and demonstrated how these 
writers changed the traditional narrative of the Emergency.  The research presented in this 
chapter adopted a similar methodology.  It too treated these memoirs as primary sources.  
Secondary sources, such as Clough and Buijtenhuijs, served to amplify detail and context.  This 
chapter also analyzes recorded oral histories from British veterans who fought the Mau Mau.  
While there are several British Mau Mau memoirs, some of which this thesis cites, I believe 
these recorded oral histories serve as a more direct link to British historical memory of Mau 
Mau.  These two type of primary sources help to make a new contribution to the secondary 
source literature. 
 




Memoirs by Mau Mau 
This section analyzes the treatment of the homemade guns in memoirs written by former 
Mau Mau.  Focus on these memoirs is important because it is necessary to hear the voices of 
individuals who used these weapons.  The memoirs of interest to this section are Mau Mau 
Detainee by Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Mau Mau from Within by Karari Njama, and Mau Mau 
General by Waruhiu Itote.146  Published in the immediate decade following the close of the 
Emergency and Kenya’s independence, these works offer firsthand accounts and opinions of the 
homemade firearms.  Not only are these three works in conversation with one another, but they 
also directly and indirectly address the standardized Mau Mau narrative of the time.  This thesis 
has relied on these sources in earlier chapters.  In those cases, they served to explain the 
construction, need for, and use of homemade firearms.  For the purposes of this chapter, these 
works serve as primary sources of memory to explain the Mau Mau recollection of these 
weapons. 
 During and shortly after the Mau Mau Uprising, the British and other outsiders controlled 
the narrative of Mau Mau and Kenyan memory.  Early reports, such as F. D. Corfield’s 1960 
historical survey Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, attempted to cement the West’s 
understanding of what took place during the conflict.  His report claimed that the Uprising 
stemmed from, what he saw as, the typical friction associated with an uncivilized group 
encountering a civilizing force.  He believed the speed with which the civilizing process took 
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place is what exacerbated this friction into outright conflict.  Corfield does acknowledge the land 
dispute at the center of the Mau Mau cause, but he attributes the movement’s violence to its 
adherent’s primitive tribal nature.147  When Corfield addresses the homemade guns, he treats 
them as almost an afterthought in a larger chapter about firearms.  He provides a factual 
description of their construction and then editorializes their performance and effectiveness.148  In 
general, his report offered statistics and a detailed explanation of events from the British 
perspective but furthered the Western idea of primitive Africans unwilling to accept civilization.  
Regarding the homemade guns, he labeled them as a means of attaining “Dutch courage,”149 
despite their ubiquity on the battlefield. 
However, with the arrival of Kenya’s independence, the Mau Mau themselves began to 
offer a rebuttal to the British-centric narrative.  These refutations took the form of memoirs, in 
which Kikuyu Kenyans offered their perspective of events and, often, exposed atrocities 
perpetrated by the British.  Because of their boldness and detail from the Mau Mau side of the 
story, these memoirs regularly gained the attention of readers outside of Kenya and became a 
form of political discourse within it.150 
Mau Mau Detainee was the first of this kind of memoir.  Josiah Mwangi Kariuki artfully 
described his life in the early days of the movement and the seven years he spent as a prisoner in 
fourteen different detention camps within Kenya.151  Detainee tore at the very foundation of 
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academic and political thought on the Mau Mau movement and the Emergency.  Kariuki even 
took issue with the use of Mau Mau as a name of the movement. 152  When he used the term, he 
placed it within quotation marks to highlight this point.  Kariuki’s dedication to reclaiming the 
language of Mau Mau runs throughout his memoir.  No longer were adherents “terrorists” or 
“gangsters.”  Kariuki recast them as “freedom fighters.”  Kenyan politicians looking to ingratiate 
themselves to former Mau Mau after independence often took up this language.  This practice 
still holds true today and demonstrates Detainee’s lasting influence on Kenyan political culture. 
Kariuki became politically active in the movement in the early days of the Uprising.  He 
served as a liaison and procurement officer prior to his detainment.  The hotel he operated in 
Nakuru served as a front in support of his efforts.  Government forces detained Kariuki in his 
hotel on October 28, 1953, just over a year after the British declaration of the Emergency.153  
Despite his early detention, Kariuki remained engaged in the movement.  He gained knowledge 
of the fighting and methods of firearms manufacturing from contact with other prisoners.  He 
makes it clear that the procurement of arms and ammunition were of the highest priority for the 
Mau Mau but offers a defensive motive for this goal.  From his perspective, the need for firearms 
was due to the overwhelming military response of the British.  To explain his point, Kariuki 
relates a Kikuyu parable.  He likens the Mau Mau to children tossing a panga, a type of machete, 
at an adult who responds by skillfully throwing it back at the child.154  Therefore, according to 
Kariuki, had the British not responded with machine guns and aerial bombs, the Mau Mau would 
not have stolen and built firearms to refit their initial armament of knives and spears.  Just as 
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Kariuki recast the language regarding Mau Mau, he repurposed the need and use of the 
homemade guns.  This placed the homemade guns within the context of a defensive last resort, 
rather than a means of bolstering up the courage of fighters, as Corfield claimed. 
Additionally, Kariuki uses the homemade guns as one of the dividing lines between two 
factions within the Militant Wing of the movement.  The KLFA was the organized military 
effort.  The Komerera, on the other hand, were more akin to a militia.  While the KLFA had rank 
structure, discipline, and a logistical network, the Komerera were a less organized unit.  They 
acted more desperately to procure food and weapons.  The KLFA set up regular camps deep 
within the forests, whereas the Komerera hid within the Reserves and the edges of the forests.  
According to Kariuki, the KLFA fought the war as cleanly as a group could, but he laid the 
preponderance of Mau Mau atrocities at the feet of the Komerera.155  In Kariuki’s eyes, the 
KLFA was a noble force with the means and ability to set up firearm factories in the forests and 
mountains.  He disparagingly states that the Komerera “did not have the skill to make their own 
guns,” likening them to a rabble who would kill their own to acquire food and supplies156  
Kariuki established an interesting dichotomy and, in doing so, struck at the monolithic structure 
of the Mau Mau favored by the British. 
In 1966, three years after the publication of Mau Mau Detainee, a second memoir 
contributed to the Kenyan side of the story.  Unlike Kariuki, however, Karari Njama did fight in 
the forest and relied on homemade firearms to advance the cause.  Mau Mau from Within 
detailed the extensive experiences of Njama during his time as a guerilla fighter the Aberdares.  
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Njama was born in 1926 to a “squatter” family in the Rift Valley.  “Squatters” lived a feudalistic 
life on land stolen from them by white European settlers.157  When Njama was twelve years old, 
he began his formal education at a nearby school.  When his father died, he left school and went 
to live in the reserves.  Though he only attended school for two years, he made the most of it.  He 
became an avid reader and even worked for a short time as a teacher.158  No doubt his literacy 
and formal education helped place Njama at the side of Dedan Kimathi.  In addition to serving as 
the Field Marshal’s secretary, Njama operated as a liaison officer between the scattered 
commands and camps in the Aberdares Range.159  As a liaison officer, Njama traveled between 
camps, relaying orders from Kimathi and conducting inspections.  During his inspections, he 
often remarked about homemade guns or, as he called them, banda.160 
According to Njama, Kimathi had a great interest in manufacturing firearms.  Njama 
recorded an example of this at a five-day meeting of Mau Mau leadership at Mwathe.  This 
meeting took place in August 1953, just ten months after the Declaration of Emergency.  During 
that period, Mau Mau fighters operated in an ad hoc way.  The leadership within the Aberdares 
region decided to institute some level of organization and unified command.  Most of their 
decisions confirmed what developed organically, but they also solidified areas of responsibility 
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and rank structure.161   During this important time, Kimathi instructed his generals on the priority 
of manufacturing firearms.  According to Njama, Kimathi ordered, 
I want to see every warrior with a gun and you must work hard to achieve this in 
as short a time as possible.  You must collect dues from our members, as much as 
you can, and spare the money for buying ammunition, medicine, clothing, 
stationary, and guns-factory equipment.  It has been reported to me that an 
excellent blacksmith has entered the forest in the Ruthani area and that he can 
make guns with no difference from the manufactured ones.  We would be very 
glad and if this proved true we would require a smith for every camp to get 
together and be taught by him.  I hope that this would improve and quicken our 
supply of arms.162 
In the days before he said this, Kimathi gained official recognition as the supreme commander of 
the Aberdares region and the entire KLFA.  His desire to take time to express the importance of 
making guns and suggesting ways to do it, demonstrates the importance of these weapons to the 
movement. 
In addition to this, Njama provides other instances of Kimathi and his headquarters 
issuing orders regarding homemade guns.  For example, two months prior to the Mwathe 
meeting, Kimathi sent a written order to the various leaders within his region.  The order was 
regarding a planned raid.  It contained seven points on how to conduct the raid.  In the seventh 
point, Kimathi ordered his guerillas to seize all available water pipe in the area.  Specifically, 
sizes one and a half to three quarters inch in diameter.  The express purpose for this pipe was for 
making gun barrels.163  As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, a water pipe was the most 
common type of material used for the construction of a homemade gun’s barrel.  A second 
example comes from the headquarters camp at Kariaini.  The headquarters ordered, likely at the 
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behest of Kimathi, that guerillas were to obtain from nearby reserves the necessary tools and 
equipment to construct gun factories.164  Njama’s recollections demonstrate that the methods of 
gun manufacture interested the highest levels of Mau Mau leadership.  While many of the 
weapons appeared as simplistic and haphazard to the British, much thought and planning lay 
behind their construction. 
Despite their importance to the KLFA’s military effort, the drawbacks to these guns exist 
in Mau Mau memory as well.  In Mau Mau from Within, Njama recalls a negative personal 
experience with a banda.  One afternoon, Njama volunteered for sentry duty and posted up at a 
stream crossing near camp.  As the day wore on, a thick mist reduced his visibility to fifty yards.  
After some time, a small enemy force entered the area.  Njama, armed with a homemade gun, 
took aim at his enemy.  He pulled the trigger, but the weapon misfired.  He cocked the weapon 
again and attempted to fire a second time.  The gun failed again.  He then moved to a new 
position, loaded a fresh round and tried a third time.  Nothing.  After this third misfire, Njama 
fled the area to warn his comrades.165 
Njama’s story is quite remarkable; he was lucky to escape the area with his life.  
Throughout his memoir, Njama says positive things about homemade guns.  This story is a rare 
exception.  One reason for telling it may have to do with what happened the following day.  
While he did disparage that particular weapon, he still held faith in the gun-manufacturing plan.  
The next day, he told some fellow guerillas about his experience.  He showed them the weapon 
and pulled the trigger.  This time the gun fired.  The men inspected the firearm and decided that 
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the moisture from the mist prevented the spring from operating correctly.  According to Njama, 
the guerillas told him they distrusted the homemade guns because of such problems.  Njama 
reassured them that, while his weapon failed, the majority of their banda operated just fine, 
especially in good weather.166 
This anecdote serves more than one purpose.  At the time of the incident, it reassured his 
comrades that the homemade guns were useful tools.  Regarding historical memory, Njama 
reinforces his support of Kimathi’s gun manufacturing plans.  Since his execution in 1957, 
Kimathi gained the status of a martyr.  Njama was politically wise to remain supportive of 
something he saw as a Kimathi initiative.  Mau Mau from Within, while lengthy and full of 
detail, is mostly restricted to the Aberdares region of the rebellion.  The other key forest theater 
was Mount Kenya.  For that region, it is necessary to turn to General China. 
Waruhiu Itote, known as General China, is a fountain of information about the 
homemade guns of the Mau Mau.  Because of his direct involvement with the first examples of 
homemade guns, his memoir, Mau Mau General, and his Interrogation Report reside at the 
center of this thesis.  Itote does not credit himself with the idea of manufacturing guns in the 
forest, he attributes that to General Tanganyika, but he may well be the midwife of the 
invention.167  As the most prominent Mau Mau leader to write a memoir, he provides excellent 
insight for historical memory purposes. 
    According to Itote, the first homemade gun experiments took place on Mount Kenya in 
early 1953.  He and Tanganyika detonated a .303 caliber round with a nail.168  That risky 
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procedure was a fitting start to the process.  It demonstrated the great need for firearms in the 
early months of open warfare and the lengths certain people were willing to go to make up the 
gap.  Itote talks of the excitement shared when their experiment worked and, though sparsely 
written, this enthusiasm comes across nearly seventy years later.  Itote also names the first two 
gunmakers as Ngoma and Waiwai.  These men created the first two working prototypes.  Itote 
sent the two guns to Dedan Kimathi for inspection.  Kimathi praised them and, to Itote’s 
displeasure, sent the guns to Mau Mau fighters in the reserves.169  This is likely when Kimathi 
developed his enthusiasm for homemade guns that Njama expresses in his memoir. 
Once his Mount Kenya factory was up and running, Itote reports rapid advances with the 
manufacturing process and in the quality of the final product.  According to Itote, 
Twenty experts began work with me, and each company sent another twenty for 
training. Ruku, a young man from Murang’a, was in charge of the operation, and 
no weapon could leave the factory until he signed a release order. His assistants 
included Mukungi of North Tetu; Kamirigiti from Nanyuki; Kamwana from 
Mathira; and our original inventors, Waiwai and Ngoma Kagio. As more and 
more people learnt how to make guns, it was no longer possible to pinpoint any 
invention or innovation as being the work of one particular person. At the same 
time, and perhaps more than anything else, the proliferation of this skill and its 
improvement demonstrated that our men were equal in intelligence to anyone.  
Had we had the opportunities, many of us would have gone far in such fields as 
engineering.170   
Itote describes nothing but success.  A key takeaway from this statement is the pride Itote had in 
his engineers.  Throughout Kenya’s colonial period, the British held back the Kikuyu and other 
indigenous peoples.  The majority of them became alienated farmers, forced to squat on land 
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they once owned or move into reserves.  As the British brought technological advances, they 
allowed relatively few Kikuyu into these areas of expertise.  Itote is keenly aware of the 
perception of his people held by Western readers, thus his point about equal intelligence and 
opportunities. 
It is also important to understand the body of Mau Mau General only describes the 
beginning of gun factories on Mount Kenya.  The appendices of Itote’s memoir and his 
interrogation by Ian Henderson provide amplifying detail.  Itote started with this small cadre and, 
in about a year’s time, developed a network of factories servicing forty companies within his 
Hikahika Battalion.171  The main factory remained under his command at his Barafu 25 
Headquarters.  Itote claims over 500 forest fighters guarded this one factory.  In it, engineers 
turned out an average of forty-two guns per week.172  In addition to manufacturing firearms, it 
served as the schoolhouse for future gunmakers.  Itote sent these graduates to engineer units at 
the company level on Mount Kenya or into the Passive Wing.  Passive Wing gunmakers operated 
“one-man factories” in the reserves.  Between May 1953 and his capture in January of 1954, 
Itote claimed around 400 such engineers received training to operate in the reserves.173  In this 
case, Itote’s 1954 interrogation substantiates his 1967 memoir, therefore, increasing the 
credibility of his claims. 
Analyzing Mau Mau from Within and Mau Mau Genreal together highlights the bias of 
memoirs and the nuance required when using them as primary historical sources.  Because of the 
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credibility of the relevant portions of Itote’s memoir, it seems he does not receive the credit due 
to him in Mau Mau from Within.  This creates an interesting disagreement within Mau Mau 
historical memory.  Based on Itote’s memory and his interrogation, it appears that the Barafu 25 
factory was up and running well before Kimathi’s orders at the Mwathe meeting.  Therefore, 
Itote and his Mount Kenya factory network led the way on the actual manufacture of firearms.  
Kimathi’s Aberdares factories had to play catchup after his August 1953 order.  Njama does not 
ignore Itote entirely, but when he mentions the general, it is not in relation to homemade guns.  
This omission is likely two-fold.  First, Njama is a Kimathi acolyte and never served under Itote.  
As noted above, he remained a loyal Kimathi promoter after the field marshal’s execution in 
1957.  Second, Njama potentially still saw Itote as a collaborator in 1966, the year he published 
Mau Mau from Within.  The fact that Itote experienced success in the Kenyatta administration 
may have increased Njama bitterness towards someone who he saw as a disgraced Mau Mau 
leader.174 
All three memoirs mentioned above offer a different Mau Mau perspective of the 
conflict. Their differing points of view added layers to a narrative that, at the time, was much less 
complicated.  On the other hand, reports, such as Corfield’s, and other Western works placed the 
Mau Mau on a spectrum ranging from “savage” to “menace.”  Kariuki stretched that spectrum all 
the way out to “freedom fighter,” thus forever changing the language of Mau Mau.  His use of 
the homemade guns as a dividing line between the KLFA and the Komerera did much the same.  
Clearly, he did not view all Mau Mau fighters equally.  Njama’s work recalls the spread and use 
of banda within the Aberdares region.  For reasons previously argued, he accredited Kimathi 
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with much of this proliferation.  Njama’s experience with a faulty gun added a dose of lethal 
reality to this dangerous program.  The memoir and interrogation of Itote added a timeline, 
names, and organization to the memory narrative.  He explained not only why the Mau Mau 
needed to create their own guns, but also how they did so.  One cannot say that without Itote, 
there would be no homemade guns.  However, based on his account, it is hard to see how they 
could have become the primary firearm of the movement without him.  The disagreements 
between Njama and Itote introduce political and geographical differences to the narrative.  Taken 
as a whole though, it is clear that homemade guns are an important aspect to Mau Mau fighters 
and their historical memory narrative.  Another group had firsthand experience with these guns.  
The next section focuses on their perspective. 
Oral Histories of British Veterans of the Mau Mau Uprising 
The IWM archives contain a number of oral history interviews related to Mau Mau.  Oral 
history is an important aspect of historical memory.  It serves as an avenue for historians to 
capture the stories of individuals that experienced historical events.  The IWM’s Mau Mau oral 
histories are audio recordings.  The recordings of interest to this thesis feature interviews with 
British regular army officers, KAR troops, and civil servants that were present in Kenya during 
the State of Emergency.  While the histories offer a great variety in experience, rank, and type of 
service, they only offer the British perspective.  The museum’s lack of Mau Mau or loyalist 
Kikuyu oral histories is a glaring loss to the record.  However, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
oral histories available can serve as a counter perspective to the memoirs discussed above.  The 




On September 12, 1956, Detainee 1540 penned a letter to the Officer in Charge of the 
Mathira Works Camp.  According to his letter, he surrendered to Government forces as a Mau 
Mau fighter and confessed to his crimes.  His real name was Simon Peter Ngatia Macheria, but 
he admitted to being the gunmaker known as General Doctor Russia. The man he wrote this 
letter to was Terrance John Image.175  In 1991, Image provided an oral history to the IWM.  In 
that interview, he discussed his time as a prison officer in Kenya during the Mau Mau 
Uprising.176  Image arrived in Kenya in January 1956.  His first post was to a convict prison in 
the northern part of the colony.  He recalls only one Mau Mau detainee within that prison.  The 
rest were individuals convicted of non-Mau Mau crimes.177 
By late 1956, he was the commandant of the Mathira Works Camp at Karatina.  Unlike 
his previous posting, this camp dealt strictly with Mau Mau detainees.  According to his 
interview, he was in charge of the administration of the camp, not of the rehabilitation of Mau 
Mau insurgents.  Image makes it clear that the British and loyal Kikuyu who dealt with 
rehabilitation were separate from his own prison officers.178  This distinction is noteworthy.  The 
rehabilitation process is fraught with charges of abuse and improper treatment of individuals 
believed to be Mau Mau adherents.179  In fact, the crux of Macheria’s letter to Image refers to ill 
treatment and confinement.  Macheria reiterates that he surrendered under amnesty and showed 
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government forces his camp and gun factory.180  Image claimed that detainees often wrote to him 
as commandant to seek better treatment and to demonstrate that they no longer abided by their 
oaths as Mau Mau.181  It is possible that Macheria’s abilities as a gun maker prevented him from 
enjoying the benefits of amnesty.  He built at least one homemade gun housed at the IWM.  It is 
one of the more sophisticated examples in their collection.  It features a working bolt action, 
magazine, and trigger.182  Based on this evidence, Macheria was very skilled at his craft.  Image 
provided the letter to the IWM archives, but it is unclear if he intervened in the detention of 
Macheria.  Image’s oral history as a prison officer stands out among the collection at IWM.  
Because of the difficult history surrounding the prison system in Kenya, few people involved 
may have been willing to discuss their time there.  It is fortunate that Image decided to tell his 
story.  Among other aspects, he provides an excellent memory of a Westerner interacting with a 
Mau Mau gun maker. 
The majority of the IWM’s Mau Mau oral histories come from soldiers who served in 
Kenya during the Emergency.  These histories are important to Mau Mau historical memory 
because they provide the point of view of men who engaged directly with the Mau Mau.  Great 
Britain relied on a variety of forces to put down the Uprising.  In addition to colonial forces 
based within Kenya, such as the KAR, they deployed British Army Regulars.183  These soldiers 
came primarily from the Devonshire Regiment (The Devons) and the Royal East Kent Regiment 
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(The Buffs).  John Pomeroy Randle and Dennis James Dell served in these units and deployed to 
Kenya. 
John Randle was an officer with the Devons in Kenya between 1953 and 1955.184  During 
his interview, he discussed search and destroy procedures for flushing out Mau Mau forest 
fighters.  Randle’s unit operated in the Aberdares and spent two or three days at a time in the 
forest.  While there, he and his men patrolled in squads within predesignated areas.  When they 
encountered Mau Mau activity, his platoon rallied to that location.185  This type of patrolling to 
contact is a tactic used in counterinsurgency when small units are responsible for large areas.  
Most of the time they did not encounter actual Mau Mau fighters on these patrols.186  This is not 
too surprising.  The tactics his unit employed allowed the Mau Mau to determine contact.  When 
they came across a Mau Mau camp or cache, they collected or destroyed whatever weapons, 
supplies, and intelligence available.187  Randle does not mention finding homemade guns 
specifically, however, Dennis Dell does remember them.   
As an enlisted man, Dell served with the Buffs from 1961 to 1962.188  He and his men 
used very similar tactics to Randle.  Despite the fact that this was in the year preceding 
independence, British troops still operated against the remaining Mau Mau forces in the colony.  
According to Dell, the Buffs searched the reserves and forests for weaponry and other 
contraband.  Dell recalls regularly finding homemade guns.  He remarks that they seemed more 
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dangerous to the shooter than his intended target.189  In fact, many of the oral histories from 
white KAR soldiers express a similar idea as well.190  Were they really that dangerous and 
useless? 
Balancing the Historical Memory of the Banda 
It is clear that British soldiers’ negative sentiments have influenced historical memory of 
the guns.  The reasons for this are manifold.  The British effectively suppressed the Mau Mau 
Uprising.  Whether or not the Mau Mau helped to achieve Kenyan independence often receives a 
political response rather than a historical one.  The British were also the first to make a historical 
argument regarding the Mau Mau and their homemade guns.  The Corfield Report and early 
academic writings told the British side of the story.  Memoirs written by former Mau Mau 
responded to a narrative that the West already believed.  This is a case of the collective memory 
of one side outweighing the other.  How can one find a balance to determine a more accurate 
historical memory? 
It is true that the homemade guns could harm their shooter.  One of the examples held at 
the IWM demonstrates this.  This particular gun has a ruptured chamber.  It appears that when its 
user attempted to fire, the bullet exploded in the chamber, potentially injuring the user.191  The 
anecdote of Njama’s three misfires is another example of a weapon malfunction.  Obviously, the 
use of any homemade or improvised weapon poses a significant threat to the one wielding it.  
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However, the level of danger that the British remember does not seem to bare out in memories of 
the Mau Mau themselves.  In the works reviewed in this chapter, the Mau Mau extol these 
weapons.  The sheer number of homemade weapons used in the field also counters the British 
recollection.  The goal of leaders like Itote and Kimathi was to force out the British from Kenya.  
They believed homemade guns would provide them a way to achieve this goal.  If the guns were 
as dangerous as the British remember them to be, then why did the Mau Mau leadership want 
them in the hands of every freedom fighter?  Itote himself saw deficiencies in their mission 
objectives.  It is a giant leap, however, to assume Mau Mau leadership purposely armed their 
fighters with weapons that helped their enemies more than it hurt them.  Based on Itote’s memoir 
and the different examples housed at the IWM, the dangers present in early models likely 
decreased over time.  As gunmakers, like Macheria, became more proficient in their craft, their 
ability to overcome earlier deficiencies developed as well.  The British memory of the guns most 
likely demonstrates a shared memory of something they dismissed as a poor excuse for a firearm.  
British collective memory also shows racial bias against their African adversaries.  The positive 
bias of the memory held by the Mau Mau cancels out this negative bias of the British.  The 
balance of the historical memory suggests that the guns were, overall, useful and effective tools 
at the tactical level.  While they did not close the firepower gap between the belligerents, these 
guns helped narrow it.  In addition, they should be remembered as a unique demonstration of 






 In the early days of their uprising, the Mau Mau could not field enough weapons to arm 
the KLFA.  Theft and left behind firearms did not fill the gap.  Strict firearms laws enacted and 
enforced by the British Colonial Government exacerbated the firearms gap.  Unlike other 
liberation movements of the time, Mau Mau did not earn support from an outside group.  Instead 
of their military aspirations dying on the vine, they engineered a way to build their own firearms.  
Designed by intelligent and creative individuals, Mau Mau gunmakers built these weapons out of 
Kenya itself.  Trees from its forest, pipes from its infrastructure, and springs from its urban 
centers.  In the hands of a Mau Mau forest fighter, as the primary type of firearm in the 
movement, it became a deadly item of pride and status.  Their lethality gained the respect of the 
Mau Mau’s adversary.  
 As colonial troops fighting under the flag of Great Britain during the Second World War, 
future Mau Mau leaders experienced the world beyond Kenya.  Some saw combat in the Far 
East, but most of these Kikuyu soldiers served a clerks and logisticians.  These were the 
necessary skills to source and deploy their improvised firearm.  It was these less glorious, but no 
less important, aspects of warfare that informed the Mau Mau generals.  When the Uprising 
came, the KLFA developed their strategic goals of an independent Kenya.  However, their 
battles took place at the tactical level.  Their chronic firearms shortage relegated much of their 
offensive operations to weapon raids.  Armed with their homemade guns, they enforced strict 
rules of engagement to maximize surprise and minimize the dangers of their own weapons.  
Within the forests and foothills, the KLFA waged a defensive guerilla campaign.  Masters of the 




creativity, they turned simple ambushes into torture chambers for the British.  Yet, the tactical 
success that their homemade guns gained them, limited their ability to achieve strategic goals.  
Eventually, the counter-insurgency techniques of the British pushed the remaining hardcore of 
the Mau Mau deep into the forest.  Forcing Mau Mau fighters into desperation, many were 
captured or killed venturing out for food, while others surrendered and served in pseudo-gangs. 
 The homemade guns remain central in Mau Mau memory and hold a prominent place in 
their memoirs.  Detainees, soldiers, and generals knew of the guns’ importance to the movement.  
They remember the pride and danger of using their banda.  The British, too, remember these 
guns.  They discovered them in weapons caches and lying in wait for them in ambushes.  Not 
surprisingly, they had a low opinion of such a rudimentary weapon.  But this opinion does not 
counter the fact that the guns displayed ingenuity and resourcefulness.  Homemade guns 
narrowed the firepower gap in a lopsided conflict. 
 In November 1971, a Mau Mau veterans organization gathered at a solidarity meeting 
held for President Jomo Kenyatta.  The members dressed in the garb of the forest fighter, clothes 
of animal skin and dreadlocked hair.  They attended the meeting on behalf of the Kenyatta 
government to rally ex-Mau Mau to his Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) party.  This, and 
other groups like it, acted as special interest and lobbyist groups for various reforms in Kenya.  
After nearly a decade of independence, Kenyatta and his party actively sought the support of 
Mau Mau veteran groups.  While there, the group posed for a photograph and held a large sign 




READY WITH / OUR PANGAS AND OUR HOME MADE GUNS…”192  Taken at face value, 
these veterans were ready to physically enforce their views in a way only the Mau Mau could.  
The specific reference to homemade guns demonstrates their cultural importance.  They are, 
indeed, the calling card of the Mau Mau, an item unique to their struggle for land and freedom. 
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